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Introduction
Ethiopia has adopted a federal system de facto since 1991, and de jure since 
1995 with a view to decentralizing power and resources from the center and 
to accommodate the diverse ethno-linguistic groups that exist in the country. 
As constitutionally entrenched division of power between federal and state 
governments is at the bedrock federalism and as the division of powers often 
is far from clear, it is inherent in any federal system that there must be an or­
gan for the adjudication of constitutional issues and for the settlement of dis­
putes concerning the competence of the two levels of governments. In the 
1995 Ethiopian federal constitution, this task is entrusted to the non­
legislative second chamber, otherwise known as the House of Federation 
(HoF).
This article attempts to review the experience of the HoF ever since its estab­
lishment by assessing the relevant Ethiopian laws and the decisions of the 
HoF. With this in view the first sections are devoted, though briefly, to the 
discussion of the varied practices adopted in some constitutional systems. 
The remaining sections discuss the underlying reasons for the adoption in the 
1995 federal Constitution of Ethiopia, the HoF as a unique institution for the 
adjudication of disputes and explore its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the judiciary 
and analyse its achievements and challenges.
The general trend observed is that despite institutional and pragmatic 
challenges, the HoF has over the years evolved as a legitimate body for 
the settlement of disputes at least as far as issues of high political and con­
stitutional significance are concerned. This article further discusses the ex­
tent to which the role of the judiciary has been affected owing to the role of 
the HoF.
1. Federalism and the Adjudication of Disputes: Introductory 
remarks and context
Ethiopia is a multicultural, multi-religious and the second most populous 
country (by latest estimates 77,000,000) in Africa next to Nigeria. Except for 
the 20th century and leaving out some exceptions, Ethiopia existed for the
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most part of its long and independent history, principally under a monarchy 
with the Orthodox Christian faith serving as pillars of unity along with vari­
ous kinds of regional forces representing diversity and exercising important 
powers such as taxation on some economic activities, maintenance of local 
security and regulation of trade. Thus the seeds of what some authors call 
“federal society”1 (regionally grouped diversity) has been there for long.
Towards the end of the 19th century when Ethiopia took its present shape, and 
with the emergence of strong emperors, particularly Haile Selassie (1930­
1974) and the Military Government (1974-1991), the centre virtually abol­
ished the autonomy of all regional forces through the introduction of central­
ized taxation system, modern army and police force, by sending appointees 
from the centre to the localities and crucial of all by imposing the motto 'one 
country, one culture, one language, one people, one religion.' Thus the val­
ues of the state and its institutions became exclusive. Furthermore, while the 
process brought all sorts of diverse groups, the state structure failed to incor­
porate them into the political process and this led to the state crisis that 
reigned for the most part of the 20th century.
There is lack of consensus in explaining the source of the state crisis but two 
of the most dominant perspectives include the "instrumentalists"2 most of 
whom include western observers and some Ethiopian analysts who portray 
the centralization of political power and resources as the core of the problem 
and consider the proliferation of ethnicity as wrong manifestation of political 
and economic deprivation that will simply vanish from the political spectrum 
with the decentralization of power and resources. On the other hand, advo­
cates of the "national oppression thesis" contend that Ethiopia was simply the 
"prison house of nationalities" and hence call not only for the decentraliza­
tion of power and resources but also for the accommodation of the different 
groups into the political process by ensuring self rule and adoption of plural­
istic language policy. The latter claim that identity may change or adapt in
1 See William Livingston, "A Note on the 
Nature of Federalism," Political Science 
Quarterly, 67:1 (March 1956): Pp. 81-95. 
The introductory observations draw from 
Assefa Fiseha, Federalism and Accommoda­
tion of Diversity in Ethiopia: A Comparative 
Study, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 
(2006) Chapter one Pp. 1-87.
2 Such thinkers are called instrumentalists 
because they view religious and ethnic 
groups as a means to achieve some political 
and economic goal and having no relevance
thereafter. Tncluded in this category are John 
Markakis, Resource Conflict in the Horn of 
Africa, London Sage Publications, (1998); 
Christopher Clapham, “Ethnicity and the 
National Question in Ethiopia,” in Peter 
Woodward and Murray Forsyth eds. Con­
flict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: Feder­
alism and its Alternatives, Aldershot: Dart­
mouth, (1994) pp. 30-35; Jon Abbink, “New 
Configurations of Ethiopian Ethnicity: The 
Challenge of the South,” Northeast African 
Studies 50:1 (1998) p. 60.
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reaction to a given situation but does not necessarily vanish from the political 
spectrum and hence the emphasis on accommodation.
Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the ruling 
party that overthrew the military regime as an advocate of the second per­
spective and of the right of nationalities to self-determination secession in­
cluded, dominated the political scene since 1991, decided to abolish the sys­
tem of unitary government and introduced the federal system de facto since 
1991 (the Transition ranged from 1991-1994) and de jure since August 1995 
with the adoption of the Federal Constitution. Since then, Ethiopia is offi­
cially a multicultural federation forging unity in diversity constituting nine 
autonomous states and two semi-autonomous cities that are accountable to 
the federal government.
The constituent units have been reorganized with a view to ensuring self-rule 
to at least some of the major nationalities and in some units this has created 
"inconvenient" local minorities. The attempt is to forge multicultural federa­
tion whose ambition is to ensure self-rule to the different nationalities, divide 
power and resources among the different groups and adopt an accommoda­
tive language policy. Consequence of which is that unlike many constitu­
tions, the Ethiopian Constitution commences by saying "We the nations, na­
tionalities and peoples of Ethiopia” and under Article 8 the nationalities are 
declared sovereign and under Article 39 they are granted with the right to self 
-determination that among others include the right to use one's language, to 
preserve once culture and history, the right to equitable representation at fed­
eral institutions and finally and if the need arises, to secede after complying 
with some procedures.
While some observers contend that the federal system has not in any way 
reduced the nature and intensity of various conflicts, a closer observation 
seems to reveal the point that given the political atmosphere in which we 
were in 1991, that is, a virtually collapsed centralized regime in which one 
could hardly predict what will follow shortly, the different groups have over 
the last decade and half shown a clear stake in the federal arrangement. Since 
the introduction of the federal system, there has been a significant shift of 
discourse from assimilation to an open accommodation of the nationalities, 
creating a political space to historically marginalized groups. The federal sys­
tem as well has diffused the various conflicts to the local level making them 
less a threat to the centre. Besides, the argument that conflicts are recurring 
and that the federation may wither away with the ruling party is something 
that draws its evidence from the former failed federations of the USSR and 
Yugoslavia. Yet, there is ample evidence indicating that such federations
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were "window dressing federations"3 4 and not federations in reality. One 
could also make positive scenarios based on the experience from 
multicultural federations such as Switzerland and India. As such diversity is 
not a threat in itself, it becomes a fertile ground for conflict only if the system 
fails to provide a political solution to it in the form of resource and power 
sharing, the accommodation of the groups to the decision-making process 
and by ensuring self -rule.
2 Constitutional Adjudication: Conceptual Framework
Crucially important in a federation is the presence of a body that umpires 
disputes concerning the constitutionality of laws in general and the division 
of powers in particular. From the principle of constitutionally guaranteed 
division of power and the supremacy of the constitution follows that the last 
word in settling disputes about the meaning of the division of powers must 
not rest either with the federal government alone or with the states.
The constitutionally entrenched division of power is the hallmark of 
federations. However, the division of powers between the federal 
government and the states cannot be delineated in such a way as to avoid all 
conflicts. As R. Davis notes the ‘division of power is artificial, imperfect and 
a generalized skeletal thing. Political life cannot be perfectly or permanently 
compartmentalized. The words can rarely be more than approximate crude 
and temporary guides to the ongoing or permissible political activity in any 
federal system.’5 Certainly disputes about the terms of the division of power 
are bound to occur. Besides, adaptation and the need to adjust and accommo­
date the division to cope with the new, the unforeseen and the unintended 
remains crucial and interpretation is one of such methods. In the Ethiopian 
Constitution, this rather crucial function is granted to the HoF.
Time and space do not permit a comprehensive study of constitutional review 
of legislation in various federal systems. Yet in light of the relevance of this 
enterprise in consolidating the federal system, an attempt is made here to link 
federalism and the role of the judiciary, albeit with the main emphasis on the 
Ethiopian experience. Let it be clear from the outset that federalism has 
served as one of the important justifications for the introduction of the system
3 See for e.g. Daniel Elazar, Exploring Feder­
alism, Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Ala­
bama Press, (1987).
4 K. C Wheare, Federal Government 4th ed.,
London: Oxford University Press, (1963)
Pp. 60-61.
5 Rufus Davis, The Federal Principle: A 
Journey Through Time in Quest of Meaning, 
Berkley: University of California Press, 
(1978) p. 143.
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of constitutional review of legislation6. Through the tribunal that interprets 
and adjudicates constitutional issues federal systems have been able to pro­
mote legal integration7. There is no exclusive claim here that federal integra­
tion is the sole function of the tribunal or the judiciary as indeed political and 
economic factors do play a crucial role in promoting integration. Yet the 
highest tribunals of federal systems or the body that adjudicates constitu­
tional issues do also play an important role. One will note that in the Pream­
ble of the Ethiopian Constitution an express statement is made to the effect 
that the federal system aims at creating ‘one political and economic commu­
nity’ and a promise of ‘common destiny.’ The latter, if taken seriously, has 
even stronger implications in the sense that if the nationalities indeed have a 
‘common destiny’ then they have to live together. If this ambitious plan of 
federal integration is to have meaning then one avenue for such integration is 
through the mechanism of constitutional adjudication.
As already mentioned, one of the fundamental features of a federal system is 
the division of powers between the federal government and the states. 
Besides, in federal systems, not only is the federal constitution supreme but 
the federal law should also be declared supreme over contrary state law8. 
True that the supremacy of the federal law is not without limits. The federal 
legislature should enact its laws and policies within the limits set by the fed­
eral constitution. Once that condition is met however, federal law breaks con­
trary state law. Two consequences follow from this: there must be an institu­
tion that enforces the supremacy clauses and there must also be an institution 
that takes care of the daunting task of demarcating the boundary of the 
powers of the federal government and the states. Federal constitutions do 
attempt to define the scope and powers of the two levels of government but 
there is bound to exist natural imprecision in the language of the 
constitution9. Suffice it to mention here the wide meanings given to
6 Constitutionalism, the incorporation of hu­
man rights in many national constitutions 
and rule of law are the other justifications. 
The former upholds that governmental 
power is limited by constitutional norms. 
There are, therefore, procedures and institu­
tions established to enforce such limitations 
reducing the dangers of unchecked power. 
See for example Vicki Jackson and Mark 
Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law, 
New York: Foundation Press (1999) Pp. 190 
-206.
7 See Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Process
in Comparative Perspective, Oxford: Clar­
endon Press, (1989): Pp. 169; 312-313; 
herein after called The Judicial Process in 
Comparative Perspec-tive.
8 As a result of this many federal constitu­
tions stipulate not only about the supremacy 
of the federal constitution but also about the 
supremacy of federal over state law.
9 ‘Constitutional language is often imprecise 
or inconclusive, and the circumstances of its 
application often unanticipated or unforesee­
able by its authors.’ James Brudney, 
"Recalibrat-ing Federal Judicial Independ­
ence," Ohio State Law Journal 64:1 (2003) 
at 175.
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‘interstate commerce,’ 'implied powers' and the ‘necessary and proper’ clause 
by the United States Supreme Court. Through the mechanism of 
constitutional adjudication then federal integration is given a more concrete 
meaning.
2.1- Differences between Institutions: USA and Germany
For historical and philosophical reasons, constitutions have adopted different 
mechanisms for reviewing the constitutionality of laws and decisions of 
government bodies. The (dis)trust that the states may have over the judiciary, 
the differing commitments to natural law or legal positivism and the differ­
ing application of the notion of separation of powers have influenced, in one 
way or another, the nature and scope of the national institution established to 
review issues of constitutionality10. Pre-WWII Europe trusted its legislature 
and led to the horrors and that in turn led to a shift in paradigm, for instance, 
in Germany to the evolution of Constitutional Court.
Broadly speaking, one can see two patterns regarding the institutions 
empowered to adjudicate constitutional issues. Many federal systems have 
vested this important power either in their ordinary courts or separate 
constitutional courts. Accordingly, these courts not only have the power to 
interpret the constitution, but are also and even more importantly entitled to 
decide on the conformity of the laws with the constitution. What is common 
in all is the fact that there is commitment to a ‘higher law,’ that reflects the 
society’s fundamental values and a law that contravenes this higher law 
should cease to exist by some kind of procedure11. The systems do not accept 
the ‘omnipotence’ of positive law, but rather subject positive law to a supe­
rior law, according to modern notions, the latter being constitutional law. Yet 
although constitutional review through the courts is in principle based on the 
principle of subjecting legislation to a higher law, it essentially has two 
distinct forms.
On the one hand, there is this diffused (decentralized) system also called the 
American- system that accords every branch of the judiciary the right to re­
view the constitutionality of laws. In principle any court has the power to de­
clare any law or decision of an executive body unconstitutional, if such a law 
or decision violates the constitution, final appeal being reserved to the federal 
Supreme Court. This has been the case since the famous decision of Chief
10 Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in
Comparative Perspective, supra note 7: Pp.
115-131.
11 Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the 
Contemporary World (Indianapolis: Bobbs- 
Merrill, 1971) p. 15.
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Justice John Marshal of the US in Marbury v. Madison12 in 1803. Since then 
many other countries including India have adopted it. Some traces of it also 
exist in Switzerland where the courts have the power to disregard cantonal 
laws. In Switzerland, judicial control is not, however, allowed over federal 
laws.
What characterizes the decentralized system of judicial review in the US is 
the requirement of the presence of ‘real controversy and adverse parties’13 for 
the Court to decide the constitutional question. Besides the US Supreme 
Court would insist that the matter must be justiciable and must not involve 
‘political questions.’14 The ordinary courts decide constitutional issues in the 
process of disposing their routine function and review of constitutionality is, 
therefore, something that comes to the courts incidental to the case15. The 
logic of the decentralized system in a nutshell is that it is the duty of the 
judges to apply and interpret the law and in so doing if the judges find con­
tradiction and inconsistency between two laws of different hierarchies, it is 
the duty of the judges to apply the higher law16.
On the other hand, the centralized system confers the power of reviewing the
12Marbury v. Madison 5 US 1 Cranch 137 
(1803). For a detailed account of Judicial 
review and this famous case see R. Carr, 
The Supreme Court and Judicial Review, 
Greenwood Press Westport, (1970): Pp. 37­
57.
13 This is judicially invented doctrine from
Art. III of the United States Constitution. 
Thus the Court declines to give advisory 
opinions and to adjudicate what the German 
Constitutional Court does by way of abstract
review. It is established that federal judges 
will not render an opinion or decide a case 
unless there is an actual dispute between 
litigants before the Court. The Court settles 
the adverse interests and the decision must 
have effect on the parties. The case is then 
said to be justiciable. It is one of the mecha­
nisms of self-restraint developed by the 
Court over the years to avoid head on 
clashes with the other branches of the gov- 
ern-ment. John Ferejohn and Larry Kramer, 
"Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: 
Institu-tionalizing Judicial Self- Restraint,"
N. Y. U. Law Review 77:4 (2002): Pp. 1003­
1008.
14 See infra, note 48 and the accompanying
text.
15 For more comprehensive treatment of the 
differences see Allen Brewer-Carias, Judi­
cial Review in Comparative Law Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press, (1989) 
Pp. 131-135.
16 This was the essence of Hamilton’s argu­
ment in the Federalist Papers No. 78, which 
John Marshal was to further develop in his 
famous Marbury v. Madison decision. Ham­
ilton wrote, ‘The Interpre-tation of the Law 
is the proper and peculiar province of courts. 
A Constitution is, in fact, and must be re­
garded by the judges, as a fundamental law. 
It therefore belongs to them to ascertain it’s 
meaning, as well as the meaning of any par­
ticular Act proceeding from the legislative 
body. If there should happen to be an irrec­
oncilable variance between the two, that 
which has the superior obligation and valid­
ity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in 
other words, the Constitution ought to be 
preferred to the statute, the intention of the 
people to the intention of their agents.’
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constitutionality of laws to constitutional courts17. Typical of which is the 
German Constitutional Court characterized by its distinctive constitutional 
jurisdiction. It constitutes two senates each with eight judges: one handling 
mainly basic human rights cases, otherwise known as constitutional com­
plaints while the other senate decides disputes involving constitutional issues 
proper. Half of the judges are selected for a single non-renewable term of 
twelve years, by a special electoral committee of the Bundestag while the 
other half are selected by the Bundesrat and to that extent by the govern­
ments of the states. In both cases a majority of two-thirds is required which is 
impossible to arrive at unless there is a consensus among the major parties. 
Thus the federal government and the states have influence on the selection of 
the judges of the Court.
The manner of appointment as well as some of its powers, according to some 
authorities, give the Constitutional Court a hybrid role: political and legal18. 
Distinct from and independent of the ordinary courts, the Constitutional 
Court serves as a watchdog for the enforcement of the supremacy of the 
constitution. The Court as such does not involve itself in the ordinary settle­
ment of disputes unless the case relates to a constitutional question. How­
ever, it does not restrict itself to constitutional issues emanating from specific 
cases. It can also decide differences of opinion or doubts on the compatibility 
of federal or state law with the Basic Law upon the request of a few public 
bodies19.
Compared to the American Supreme Court, the German Constitutional Court 
has an extensive and wide-ranging jurisdiction regarding the Basic Law.
17 As to why many of the continental systems 
opted for a model of the constitutional court 
other than the regular judiciary see Mauro 
Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Com­
parative Perspective, supra note 7 Pp. 49­
52; 137; for a very recent account of the 
personal background of the Chief Justices of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, 
indicating very rich experience in other 
branches of the government before assum­
ing judicial position, indeed one was even a 
President of the country see William 
Rehnquist, "Lecture: Remarks of the Chief 
Justice: My Life in the Law Series," Duke 
Law Journal 52:4 (2003) Pp. 787-805.
18 Nevil Johnson, "The Federal Constitutional 
Court: Facing Up to the Strains of Law and
Politics in the New Germany," in Klaus 
Goetz and Peter Cullen eds., Constitutional
Policy in United Germany London: Frank 
Cass, (1995) P. 132.
19 See Basic Law Art. 93. For more on the 
German Constitutional Court see Rainer 
Arnold, "The German Constitutional Court 
and its Jurisprudence in 1996," The Tulane 
European and Civil Law Forum v. 11 
(Winter 1996) P. 85-110; Philip Blair and 
Peter Cullen, "Federalism, Legalism, and 
Political Reality: The Record of the Federal 
Constitutional Court" in Charlie Jeffery ed., 
Recasting German Federalism: The Lega­
cies of Unification, London: Pinter, (1999) 
Pp. 119- 154; Lars Mammen, "A Short Note 
on the German Federal Constitutional Court 
and Its Power to Review Legislation," Euro­
pean Human Rights Law Review 6:4 (2001) 
Pp. 433-438.
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Furthermore, the source and authority of the Constitutional Court are 
relatively settled for there are clear constitutional provisions empowering it, 
whereas it remains disputed, at least on academic level, as to where the 
Supreme Court’s power comes from and how it should be exercised. The 
Constitutional Court was deliberately introduced with the principal role of 
reviewing the constitutionality of laws, a pivotal role for protecting against 
the return of the evils and horrors of dictatorship. As a result, the challenges 
of ‘judicial activism’ are, broadly speaking, less serious in Germany than in 
the United States. The Constitutional Court is consciously designed to play 
an active role in its capacity as a guardian of the Basic Law. Its ‘activism’20 
is thus often tolerated21.
20 In the United States there is an ongoing 
debate on the role of the Supreme Court 
regarding judicial review: according to 
Henry Abraham, it is ‘the most awesome 
and potentially the most effective power in
the hands of the judiciary in general and the 
Supreme Court in particular.’ Every Court 
in the United States has the power to declare 
unconstitutional and hence unenforceable 
any law, any official action and any other 
action by public officials that the Court 
deems to be in violation of the Constitution. 
In the area of constitutional interpretation, 
this raises concerns because it invalidates a 
law considered to be an outcome of a num­
ber of compromises between political actors 
in Congress. Thus there are those who con­
tend that in exercising this important power 
the Courts must exercise ‘self-restraint.’ The 
Courts should remain faithful and adhere to 
the written constitution, only refer to the 
original intent as put by the framers, guided 
by strict construction of the text and give 
priority to political branches to act or not to 
act. More importantly, the Courts should not 
put their own personal preferences and phi­
losophies under the pretext of interpretation. 
They should rather adhere to judicial prece­
dents. On the other hand, there are those 
who contend that the Court should have 
some active role. Constitutions are, they 
contend, living documents to be interpreted 
in line with present realities. Thus the pro­
ponents adhere to a more affirmative role or
even aggressive role of the Court in regulat­
ing governmental laws and actions. They do 
not hesitate over the fact that the courts have 
some ‘law-making’ functions and hence at 
times prescribe policies. As a result, they 
come in a head-on clash with the charge that 
the judiciary usurps the function of other 
branches of governments. See Henry Abra­
ham, The Judiciary: The Supreme Court in 
the Governmental Process, 10th edn., New 
York: New York University Press, (1996) 
pp. 69-70; 90-91.
21 Apart from this rather oversimplified dif­
ference there exist other deeper variations 
among the institutions. The extent of the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction has already been 
briefly mentioned. In many cases not only 
has the Constitutional Court a clear mandate 
but it also does not shy away from con­
sidering cases, which the Supreme Court 
may consider political. There are also 
deeper variations in the methods and doc­
trines of interpreting the constitutions. For 
more on these issues see Danielle Finck, 
"Judicial Review: The United States Su­
preme Court versus the German Constitu­
tional Court," Boston College of Interna­
tional and Comparative Law Review 20 
(1997) Pp.123-157; James Brudney, supra 
note 9, Pp. 149-194; David Beatty, "The 
Forms and Limits of Con-stitu-tional Inter­
pretation," American Journal of Compara­
tive Law 49:1 (2001) Pp. 79-120
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2.2- The House of Federation: The Ethiopian Choice
The practice of constitutional interpretation in Ethiopia follows a different 
pattern. According to the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution, the authority to inter­
pret the Constitution is vested in the second chamber, the House of Federa­
tion. Articles 62 and 83 of the Constitution not only empower the HoF to 
decide constitutional disputes, but also to interpret the constitution22.
Unlike second chambers in other federations, the HoF has no law-making 
function23. The rationale for vesting the power of interpreting the Constitu­
tion in the HoF, and not in the regular judiciary or a constitutional court, as 
can be gathered from the minutes of the Constitutional Assembly, emanate 
from two sources. One is related to the view of the framers regarding the 
‘nature’ of the Constitution in general and to the role of the nationalities in 
particular. The framers think that the new federal dispensation is the outcome 
of the ‘coming together’ of the nationalities. Indeed, it is clearly stipulated in 
the preamble and Article 8 of the Constitution that the ‘nations, nationalities 
and peoples are sovereign.’ The Constitution is considered as the reflection 
of the ‘free will and consent’ of the nationalities. It is, in the words of the 
framers, ‘a political contract’ and therefore only the authors that are the na­
tionalities should be the ones to be vested with the power of interpreting the 
Constitution24. To this effect, the HoF that is composed of the representatives 
of the various nationalities is expressly granted the power to review the con­
stitutionality of laws and of course other essential powers as well.25
22 There has been some confusion in the ter­
minologies between what constitutes consti­
tutional disputes and constitutional interpre­
tation, although they are of less practical 
significance because both powers belong to 
the HoF. Under Article 62(1), the HoF has 
the power to interpret the Constitution. Arti­
cle 84 (1) as well states: ‘All constitutional 
disputes shall be decided by the HoF.’ Yet, 
for those who are familiar with the jurisdic­
tion of the German Constitutional Court (it 
is no secret that the two new laws: Procla­
mations No. 250/2001 and 251/2001 that 
regulate the powers of the HoF and the CCI 
are influenced by the experience of the Con­
stitutional Court), constitu-tional dispute has 
a very narrow meaning. It refers to cases in 
which a matter is referred to the CCI or the 
HoF arising from a real case and contro­
versy, which some refer to incidental/ 
concrete judicial review. However, as will
be demonstrated later, constitutional inter­
pretation could also arise in many other 
cases apart from real cases and controver­
sies. Issues regarding separation of powers 
and federalism that are referred to the Con­
stitutional Court or the HoF in the abstract 
are good examples.
23 For details on the HoF see Assefa Fiseha, 
supra note 1 Pp. 137-158.
24 See Ye Ethiopia Hige Mengist Gubae Kale 
Gubae v. 4 Hidar 14-20, 1987 E.C. 
(Minutes of the Constitutional Assembly, 
November 1994) discussions on Articles 59, 
61 and 62.
25 See Art. 62(1) that states ‘The House 
[House of Federation] has the power to in­
terpret the Constitu-tion. ’ And Art. 61(1) 
states, ‘The House of Federation is com­
posed of representa-tives of Nations, Na­
tionalities and Peoples.’ (Continued)
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The second reason is related to the first. The framers were well aware of the 
fact that empowering the judiciary or a constitutional court may result in 
unnecessary ‘judicial adventurism’ or what some prefer to call ‘judicial 
activism’ in which the judges would in the process of interpreting vague 
clauses of the Constitution put their own preferences and policy choices in 
the first place. Thus the framers argued, this might result in hijacking the 
very document that contains the ‘compact between the nationalities’ to fit the 
judges’ own personal philosophies. It is not difficult to understand the fears 
and concerns of the framers in light of the fact that the judiciary in Ethiopia 
has not yet won ‘the hearts and minds’ of the ordinary citizen.
As will be noted below, the good days in which the judiciary gains prestige 
and respect as the third branch of the government, are yet to come. Yet one 
could argue in favour and against the policy choices made in the Ethiopian 
Constitution. Elsewhere it is argued that owing to the lack of theoretically 
sound basis for the institutions that interpret the constitution in many juris­
dictions and taking into account the fact that in many countries including 
Ethiopia the prestige of the judiciary is low and that establishing deep rooted 
institutions for democracy to operate may take time, any constitution that 
claims to incorporate both constitutionalism and democracy, two of the com­
peting values, must attempt to reflect both values in the process of constitu­
tional adjudication. The application of the two values to constitutional inter­
pretation will result in establishing a tribunal composed of legal professionals 
and politicians, (similar to the Council of Constitutional Inquiry- CCI) a tri­
bunal capable of rendering binding decisions on cases brought before it. A 
tribunal so composed will be in a theoretically sound and politically legiti­
mate position. Such tribunal best suits the nature of the enterprise called con­
stitutional interpretation26.
25 (cont.) Each nationality has at least one 
member but each nationality is represented 
by one additional representative for each 
one million of its population. I have earlier 
on argued as a result that the HoF is majori- 
tarian in much the same way as the other 
house and the claim that it is guardian of the 
nationalities is rather fluid at best and pre­
tentious at worst. At state level two patterns 
are evolving. In the regional states of Ti- 
gray, Amhara, and Oromia, the state consti­
tutions established a ‘Constitutional Interpre 
-tation Commission’ composed of represen­
tatives from each district/wereda Council. In 
Tigray, the members of the HoF are also 
members of the Commission and in Amhara 
every nationality is also represented. In
SNNPRS, however, the Constitution estab­
lished a ‘Council of Nationalities,’ a house 
more or less identical with the federal HoF 
both in terms of power and composition. In 
all of the regional states mentioned, the 
Commission or the Council of Nationalities 
is assisted by the Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry (CCI) of each respective state. The 
CCI in the states as well is designed in much 
the same way as the CCI of the HoF. See 
Articles 70 and 71 of Amhara, 67-69 of 
Oromia, 67-70 of Tigray and 58, 59 and 78 
of SNNPRS state constitutions.
26 For a summary of the arguments see Assefa 
Fiseha, "A New Perspective on Constitu­
tional Review," Tilburg Foreign Law Re­
view 10:3 (2002) Pp. 237-255. (Continued)
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Behind the policy choice of the members of the Constitutional Assembly to 
vest the power to interpret the Constitution and to review the constitutionality 
of laws in the HoF, not the judiciary, has something to do with the reputation 
of the judiciary and ideological matters. In Ethiopia’s legacy of adjudication , 
cases formed part and parcel of public administration. One finds a merger of 
functions within the executive, the administration of justice and the executive 
function proper. Indeed, adjudication of cases was considered to be the prin­
cipal function of the executive. For example, during Menlik’s 1908 appoint­
ment of the ministers, the Minster of Justice was also the Chief Justice26 27.
The attempt to separate the judiciary from the executive was not that easy 
either. A long and tiring process of negotiation in 1942 led to a partial victory 
as far as the judiciary is concerned: only the highest benches, that is, the High 
Court and the Supreme Imperial Court were able to be relatively free from 
the influence of provincial administrators. In all other respects, the court 
structure until 1992, reflected the traditional practice of combining judicial 
and executive functions in the person of the local chiefs and provincial gov­
ernors. At the apex of the court structure one found until 1974, the Emperor, 
dispensing justice in the Zufan Chilot (Crown Court)28.
26 (cont.) The judiciary is often criticized for
being anti-majoritarian, at odds with the 
democratic principle; judicial activism is 
also considered at odds with the principle of 
separation of powers for it takes away the
role of the other branches of governments 
and many consider the judiciary lacks the 
competence to make law. But such opinions 
at times go too far in the sense that judicial 
functions have procedural and substantive 
limits. Judicial discretion is not as open 
asmany think it to be. Besides modern con­
stitutions stipulate many mechanisms of 
preventing tyranny and do not as such pro­
vide pure democracy. Thus we speak of 
horizontal and vertical separation of powers, 
federalism, supremacy of the constitution, 
checks and balances, human rights and so 
on. Apart from this the legitimacy of the 
court and legitimacy of the other political 
branches come from different sources. For 
the judiciary, it is its impartiality and its 
procedural fairness that it provides to the 
parties that serves its legitimate existence. 
For the other branches, it is democratic ac-
countability to the electorate. More impor­
tantly, even in the area of constitu-tional 
review, the courts may have the last say, but 
it is only for a time. The Court may modify 
or even reverse its former decision. More 
importantly, the legislature may modify or 
even reverse the decision of the court, and 
constitutional amendment as well can re­
verse the decision of a court. The decision 
of the Court may thus be overruled by other 
branches of government. See CappeUetti, 
The Judicial Process in Comparative Per­
spective, supra note 7 P. 151; H. Abraham, 
The Judiciary, supra note 20, Pp. 72; 94-95.
27 Aberra Jembere, An Introduction to the 
Legal History of Ethiopia 1434-1974, Ham­
burg: LIT Verlag Munster, (2000) Pp. 219, 
227, 240.
28 Under the unitary systems, the judiciary 
was contained within the executive branch. 
The federal Supreme Court was separated 
from the Ministry of Justice in 1992. It suf­
fers from a severe shortage of qualified legal 
and judicial personnel to operate its many 
layers of courts.
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This blend of judicial and executive functions in the latter is not without im­
plications. As briefly noted in the introduction, the crisis of the state had its 
effect on the judiciary as well. Indeed, it is difficult to see the judiciary in 
isolation from the whole political system under which it operates. First and 
foremost the judiciary never had a separate existence of its own as an institu­
tion. It was subject to all kinds of pressures from the other branches. Thus, 
external pressure on the judiciary has deep roots and is not without some 
hangovers on the new federal judiciary. Administrators at state level, even 
today, think that it is natural to order the judge or at times even close benches 
at the lower level of administration29. Second, the judiciary never survived 
the regime it established. It was no surprise to see every new regime setting 
up its own version of the judiciary that suits its mission. It was never de­
signed to be an institution as the third branch of the government in the real 
sense. This has left an impression on ordinary citizens to the effect that 
changes in government will entail another round of appointments and dis­
missals of judges. Thus in 1991 when EPRDF came to power and introduced 
the new federal system, the prestige and reputation of the judiciary was at its 
ebb, particularly in association with a despotic regime, well-known for exe­
cution of life without any semblance of due process of law30.
The judicial system in Ethiopia is under serious pressure both from what 
Cappelletti calls ‘the consumers of law and justice,’31 that is the citizens and 
the government of the society under which it operates. There is a serious 
complaint that the judiciary is dragging its feet in rendering decisions both at 
state and federal levels and as a result its role in enforcing contracts and 
creating an atmosphere of stability and predictability for business thereby 
promoting economic development, is questioned. The judiciary, on the other 
hand, complains about a whole list of factors affecting its performance: 
salary, lack of trained judges, resources and absence of economic security, 
political pressure and commitment of its own judges. Added to this is the 
ideological challenge of the ruling party. Until recently its commitment to the 
judiciary, despite the constitutional provisions was far from clear. The 
judiciary was a suspect. It was associated with pre-democratic regimes or is
29 The experience of the state courts for ex­
ample in the Somali, Oromia and Afar re­
gional states indicate the level of executive 
intervention particularly at Wereda/District 
levels. This was made clear in a workshop 
on judges held in Addis Ababa in mid Feb­
ruary 2007.
30 For a detailed account of the arguments
behind the dismissal of judges in the Transi-
tion period both from the side of the victims 
and the government see Frode Elgesem, The 
Derg Trials in Context: A Study of Some 
Aspects on the Ethiopian Judiciary, Human 
Rights Report No. 1, Norwegian Institute of 
Human Rights, University of Oslo, (1998).
31 Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Com­
parative Perspective, supra note 7 P. 58.
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considered as hostile to reform. Often top executive officials spoke about the 
importance of hizbawi dagna, ‘popular judge’ maybe implying one who is 
ideologically affiliated to the ruling party or perhaps an elected one. Only 
recently has the importance of an autonomous judiciary been realized. No 
doubt this outlook will have a bearing on the judiciary’s limited role in the 
Ethiopian context32 33.
The framers of the Constitution, however, recognized the fact that 
interpretation involves legal technicalities. As a result, the HoF is assisted by 
the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCT), consisting of eleven members 
that among others comprise the Chief Justice and his deputy of the Federal 
Supreme Court, who also serve respectively as chairman and vice chairman 
of the CCT. Six other legal experts are appointed by the President of the Re­
public with the recommendation of the lower house, as a matter of practice 
coming from different constituent states, and three persons are designated by 
the HoF from among its members.
The CCT has the power to investigate constitutional disputes. The investiga­
tion may result in a prima facie case calling for interpreting the Constitution, 
in which case the CCT is required to ‘submit its recommendations’ to the HoF 
or remand the case and render a ‘decision’ if it finds there is no need for con­
stitutional interpretation. Tn the latter case, the party dissatisfied with the de­
cision of the CCT may appeal to the HoF34. Thus it is clear that the CCT is 
merely an advisory body to the HoF, lacking the competence to give a bind­
ing decision. The HoF as well has been at liberty to disregard the CCT’s opin­
ions in some cases35.
3. The Jurisdiction and Procedures of the HoF
Although the Constitution has been less clear on the scope of powers of the 
HoF and the procedures to be employed in the process of adjudicating
32 Only in his 2003 parliamentary report in 
July 2004, the Prime Minister mentioned 
signs of improve-ment in civil matters. See 
PM’s Performance Report of 2003/4 at 
http://www.waltainfo .com/Amnews/1996/ 
Ham/meles_report.htm (visited on 09/07/04)
33 Art. 82 of the Constitution; Art. 4 of Proc­
lamation No. 250/2001, Council of Consti­
tutional Inquiry Proclamation, Federal Ne- 
garit Gazeta, 7th Year, No. 40, Addis 
Ababa, 6 July 2001; Art. 84 of the Constitu­
tion.
34 Art. 84 of the Constitution; Art. 6 of Proc.
250/2001, supra note 33.
35 The practice so far indicates that the HoF 
has for the most part endorsed the decisions 
of the CCI but in the case of the Benishan- 
gul-Gumuz case (discussed in infra) it disre­
garded the opinion of the majority and the 
minority and came up with an entirely new 
decision. It also appears that the CCI’s opin­
ion in many cases is not well-articulated and 
often is very brief. This is perhaps because 
the members are quite busy with other func­
tions and have little time to do research con­
cerning the cases.
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constitutional issues, the ‘law consolidating the HoF and defining its powers 
and responsibilities’ has attempted to clarify some of the ambiguities36. The 
issues under discussion require some remarks on this new ‘law.’
3.1- The Respective Role of the HoF and the Courts within the Constitu­
tional Framework
When one thinks of a law (enacted by the House of Peoples' Representatives 
-HoPR) that defines the ‘powers and responsibilities’ of the HoF itself estab­
lished by the Constitution to check the constitutionality of the laws of the 
HoPR, the first question that comes to mind is whether the law itself is con­
stitutional or not. Could the HoPR really define the powers and responsibili­
ties of the HoF? More specifically, does the HoPR have competence to do 
so? Would not such power, if it existed at all, lead to a conclusion that the 
HoPR may in the process limit, extend or even take away the competence of 
the HoF? Is not the HoF competent enough to define its responsibilities in 
light of the broad powers indicated in the Constitution? These are interesting 
questions which might someday be dealt with by the HoF. In the early phase 
of the process of drafting such law, some experts, aired their concerns in a 
small gathering organized by the HoF and HoPR and stated that in light of 
the function of reviewing constitutionality of laws, the attempt to define the 
powers of the HoF through the HoPR is questionable. However, their opinion 
did not seem to have won the support of the actors.
More important, however, is the issue pertaining to the compatibility of the 
two new laws with the Constitution.37 The new laws deal with the HoF and 
the CCI regarding the jurisdiction of the HoF and indirectly ‘strips the juris­
diction’ of the regular judiciary, a judiciary which has already been weak­
ened because it lacks the competence to review the constitutionality of laws. 
In an earlier study and before the enactment of the laws, this author has tried 
to define the respective roles of the Courts and the HoF38. In light of the gen­
erality of the clauses of the Constitution on the respective role of these bod­
ies, the author’s main finding was to restrict the role of the HoF in reviewing 
the constitutionality of laws enacted by the legislature: federal and state;
36 (cont.) see also Proc No. 250/2001 supra 
note 27. Except for the general clauses that 
empower the HoF to ‘interpret the constitu­
tion and to decide constitutional disputes’ 
the constitution was silent on the exact con­
tours of the vague clauses.
37 The two laws referred to are Proc.
250/2001, supra note 33, and Proc. 
251/2001, supra note 36.
38 See Assefa Fiseha, "Constitutional Inter­
pretation: The Respective Roles of the 
Courts and the House of Federation," in 
Proceedings of the Symposium on the Role 
of Courts in the Enforce-ment of the Consti­
tution, Addis Ababa: Birhanina Selam, 
(2001) Pp. 6-26.
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resolution of disputes among high federal organs mainly dealing with the 
horizontal separation of powers and umpiring federal disputes. The three im­
portant reasons for this view were as follows.
Firstly, the Constitution does not seem to wipe out the role of the judiciary 
completely. If one sticks to the terms employed by the text, the relevant 
Article states: ‘Where any federal or state law is contested as being 
unconstitutional...’ and the Amharic version which according to Article 106 
has the final legal authority in case there is contradiction between the English 
and the Amharic versions is even more explicit in stating that the term ‘law’ 
refers to laws enacted by federal and state legislative bodies39. Thus it was 
logical to argue that other subordinate regulations issued by the executive 
and decisions of governmental bodies other than ‘laws’ were left to the 
courts.
There is a second reason that leads to the same conclusion. In parliamentary 
systems (including Ethiopia), the supremacy of parliament, subject of course 
to the supremacy of the Constitution, requires that all other branches of gov­
ernment are bound to assume that legislation enacted by parliament is consti­
tutional and the courts are prohibited from nullifying such legislation. The 
presumption of constitutionality has expressly been incorporated in the new 
law40 * *. Thus, administrative acts and decisions of public bodies could be ques­
tioned for their constitutionality as well as for their conformity with the en­
actment of parliament by the regular judiciary. And the third reason pertains 
to the practice of the CCI as well hinted at this position, at least until the en­
actment of the laws. In the case of Addis Ababa Taxi Drivers’ Union v. Addis 
Ababa City Administration41 and in the case of Biyadiglign Meles et al v. Am- 
hara National Regional State42, the CCT ruled that remedies concerning the 
conformity of regulations with the enabling legislation, as well as violations 
of rights by the executive do not amount to reviewing constitutionality of 
laws and thus parties have to seek remedy from the courts.
39 Article 84(2) reads in full: ‘Where any
Federal or State law is contested as being
unconstitu-tional and such a dispute is sub­
mitted to it by any court or interested party, 
the Council shall consider the matter and 
submit it to the House of Federation for a 
final decision.’ In this provision, the term 
law might look ambiguous so as to include 
even subordinate regulations of the execu­
tive. However, its Amharic version makes it
relatively clear by specifying the point that 
‘laws’ or Higoch refers to an act of the leg­
islature {Be Federalu Mengistim Hone Be
Kilil Hig Awchi Akalat Ye Miwotu Higoch) 
at federal and state level.
40 Art. 9 of Proc. No. 251/2001 sub 1 states: 
‘Unless otherwise proved to the contrary, 
the enacted law is presumed to be constitu­
tional while the House starts to review its 
constitutional-ity.’
41 Decision of the CCI on Tirr 17/1992 E.C. 
(25 January 2000, unpublished).
42 Decision of the CCI on an application 
made onMiazia 30 1989 E.C. (8 May 1997, 
unpublished).
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However, the constitutional position as well as practice have been confused 
with the enactment of the new laws. According to the new laws, ‘law’ (that is 
subject to the investigation for its constitutionality by the HoF) shall mean 
proclamations issued by the federal or state legislative organs and regulations 
and directives issued by the federal and states government institutions and it 
shall also include international agreements that have been ratified by 
Ethiopia.’43 44 Thus by defining ‘the law’ too broadly to include all conceivable 
acts of the legislature and the executive, the drafters of the new laws that are 
supposed to define the role of the HoF and the CCI, have themselves 
apparently come up with an unconstitutional law. This is so because the 
Federal Constitution is at least clear on this point: it never intended to include 
regulations, directives and decisions of administrative bodies in the way the 
laws attempted to include. By so doing the drafters have wiped out or at least 
attempted to wipe out the jurisdiction of the courts: federal and state. The 
issue as to how this anomaly is to be settled by the HoF thus remains to be44seen .
But at least the case brought before the CCI by the Coalition for Unity and 
Democracy (CUD) 45 requesting the former to declare unconstitutional a di-
3 See Art. 2(2) and Art. 2(5) of proc. No. 
251/2001 and 250/2001 respectively.
44 When this fact was brought to the attention 
of participants in a seminar held in Decem­
ber 2002 at the Ghion Hotel by this author at 
which federal and state court judges as well 
as representatives of both federal Houses 
attended, it was like a surprise. Nobody 
really knew that so much power is being 
taken away from the courts and the Deputy 
Chief Justice did not hide his astonishment.
45 Decision of the CCI was rendered on 14 
June 2005. This is an interesting case be­
cause the Federal First Instance Court, to 
whose bench the case first appeared wilfully 
relinquished its constitutional mandate in its 
decision held on June 3, 2005 by referring 
the case to the CCI. The Court in its brief 
remark on the application of the CUD re­
jected the case for lack of mandate, adopted 
a very literal and positivist approach on the 
meaning of the 'law' and failed to analyze 
the link between the law and the Constitu­
tion. The case could have enlightened our 
understanding of constitutional practice
better if the Court adopted a different inter­
pretation. The HoF's position would then 
have been clearly tested in the case. The 
CUD is a coalition of four opposition parties 
that participated in the May 2005 parliamen­
tary election and that secured 107 seats but 
decided to boycott its seats because of alle­
gations of election fraud and vote rigging. 
While the government argued that there 
were objective reasons for the one-month 
ban on demonstrations in the capital, the 
claim being the opposition was ready for 
street violence to overthrow the government 
by unconstitutional means and hence the 
directive, the opposition on its part claimed 
it was undertaking peaceful demonstration 
as provided in the Constitution and wanted 
to declare the directive as unconstitutional. 
While there are still controversies on the 
constitutionality of the directive and no one 
is able to give conclusive verdict, it is possi­
ble to argue that the PM would have been in 
a much defensible position if he resorted to 
emergency declaration through the Council 
of Ministers as provided under the Constitu­
tion Article 93.
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rective issued following the May 2005 election crisis and its aftermath ban­
ning demonstrations in the capital for a month, was entertained by the CCI 
and the directive was considered as constitutional although the CUD started 
its case and applied to the relevant Federal First Instance Court. This is a 
very interesting case because the Federal First Instance Court to whose bench 
the case first appeared wilfully relinquished its constitutional mandate in its 
decision held on June 3, 2005 by referring the case to the CCI. This trend 
seems to conform to what is provided in the new laws for which we have 
questioned their constitutionality. This also implies that the courts are further 
stripped of their jurisdiction.
3.2- Horizontal separation of powers: A comparative overview
On the issues of horizontal separation of powers and umpiring the federal 
system, the main argument justifying the power of the HoF emanated from 
the nature of the HoF as well as from the experience that one draws from the 
Supreme Court of the United States and the German Constitutional Court. 
The latter is empowered to adjudicate disputes among the highest federal in­
stitutions: the federal president, the two federal chambers and the federal 
government in respect of their constitutional powers. Through the procedure 
of abstract review as well, it reviews the compatibility of legislation with the 
constitution. In doing so and despite express constitutionally based power, it 
has been at times criticized ‘for making political choices between competing 
legislative programs for which it is neither competent nor equipped.’46
The American Supreme Court does not have as extensive power as the 
German Constitutional Court to adjudicate abstract review or differences of 
opinion among federal branches. The Supreme Court adjudicates concrete 
disputes arising from cases and controversies between parties. The object of 
judicial review in the United States is the vindication of the rights of a party 
to a case47. Besides, the Supreme Court has developed self-restraining 
doctrines, albeit not always consistent, to minimize its active involvement in 
the competence of the legislative and executive branches. The Court has 
avoided cases brought before it by invoking the ‘political question 
doctrine.’48 Broadly speaking such cases included matters concerning the
46 Donald Kommers, "Comparative Constitu­
tionalism: German Constitutionalism a Pro- 
legome-non," Emory Law Journal 40:3 
(1991) Pp. 837-874.
47 Christopher Wolf, The Rise of Modern 
Judicial Review, New York: Basic Books 
Inc., (1986) p. 102.
48 This notion is far from clear but according 
to the opinion of the Court, the constitution 
has reserved certain kinds of questions for 
ultimate decision by the political branches 
and such questions are beyond judicial ex­
amination or considered as non-justiciable. 
(Continued)
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‘republican form of the government,’ ‘the conduct of foreign affairs,’ issues 
related to war, impeachment, ‘presidential powers discretion,’ and recogni­
tion of foreign governments.
For these kinds of issues, it is argued, the political branches rather than the 
Supreme Court are relatively more legitimate to address the resolution of dis­
putes among the branches of the federal government. The exact contours of 
the political question doctrine is less precise though. It appears that the doc­
trine has some relevance when it concerns the exercise of powers within the 
confines of the (horizontal) separation of powers. It becomes relevant when 
the question is whether one of the institutions is alleged to have encroached 
upon the powers of the other branches. There and then the Court does not 
seem to hesitate to adjudicate the matter. But the doctrine becomes less rele­
vant, for instance, if the issue is as to whether the executive made the correct 
use of its executive powers because discretion is often left to the same insti­
tution and the judiciary cannot replace the executive. While this has been the 
general trend, some, like Jesse Choper, went even further in stating that:
The federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions concerning 
the respective powers of Congress and the President vis-a-vis one another; 
rather the ultimate constitutional issue of whether executive action (or inac­
tion) violates the prerogatives of Congress or whether legislative action (or 
inaction) transgresses the realm of the President should be held to be non­
justiciable, their final resolution to be remitted to the interplay of national 
political process48 49.
At any rate, issues concerning the horizontal separation of powers often fall 
within the grey areas of law and politics and the settlement of such disputes 
truly involves political matter, which the regular judiciary may lack the com­
petence to deal with. However, the HoF would be the most suitable candi­
date as it is more a political than a judicial body. It is in recognition of this 
fact that it is stated: ‘A case requiring constitutional interpretation which may 
not be handled by courts may be submitted to the CCI by, at least, one-third 
of the members of the federal or state councils or the federal or state
48 (cont.) It is in a way one other item of judi­
cial self-restraint. The Court removes some 
cases from consideration because the matter 
is deemed inappropriate for resolution by
judges. But the borderline between what 
constitutes a constitutional or political case 
is never easy to draw. See for example Tim 
Koopmans, Courts and Political Institu­
tions: A Comparative View, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press (2003) P. 52, 
98-104; The most often cited cases indicat­
ing the Court's inconsistent interpretation on 
this matter is Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 
(1962) ans Bush vs Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000).
49 Jesse Choper, Judicial Review and the Na­
tional Political Process, Chicago: The Uni­
versity of Chicago Press, (1983) p. 263.
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executive bodies.’50 No specific case has yet been reported under this proce­
dure but it may be interpreted to cover two crucial aspects: horizontal separa­
tion of powers both at federal and state levels as well as vertical division of 
powers between the federal and state governments. This appears to be so 
from the nature of the parties.
3.3- Respective powers at federal and state levels
The same could be said about the task of defining the respective powers of 
the federal government and the states, an essential aspect of federal systems. 
In the United States, the conventional wisdom until the 1990s has been that 
federalism in general and the right of states in particular provided no judi­
cially enforceable limits on Congressional power51. The Court relied on the 
political safeguards of federalism. It was argued that a final solution on the 
federal government’s encroachment on state power disputes should be sought 
from the political process. The states are well-represented in Congress. On 
the other hand, the Supreme Court should invalidate state laws if they en­
croach upon federal power52.
However, the Supreme Court has since 1992 changed its position and 
established itself as a guardian of the federal system. In New York v. United 
States53 and Printz v. United States54, the Court made a remarkable shift from 
its earlier position in controlling Congress from violating the constitutional 
power of the states. To this one may add its decisions on commerce clause, 
US v. Lopez55 and US v. Morrison56. In all these cases, the Court argued, it is 
its duty to protect the authority of the states, albeit, in many cases by a 
majority.
In Germany, decisions of the FCC on two of its important powers, namely 
the settlement of disputes between major political institutions57 and abstract
50 Art. 23(4) of Proc. No. 250/2001. This 
clause specifies the parties who have stand­
ing before the HoF as far as issues involving 
constitutional interpretation are concerned. 
Needless to say the courts cannot handle 
cases involving constitutional interpretation.
51 Notable exception is National League of 
Cities v. Usury 426 US 833 (1976).
52 Choper, supra note 49 at 175, 206; Edward
Rubin and Malcolm Feeley, "Federalism-
Some Notes on the National Neurosis,"
UCLA Law Review 41:4 (1994) Pp. 903­
952; Erwin Chemerins-ky, "The Values of
Federalism," Florida Law Review 47:4 
(1995) Pp. 499-540.
53 New York v. United States 112, S. Ct. 2408 
(1992).
54 Printz v. US 521 US 98, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 
(1997).
55 US v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
56 US v. Morrison 529 US 598, 608, (2000).
57 This refers to the FCC competence to de­
cide disputes as to the rights and duties of 
the federation and the states. It is basically a 
question of defining the respective jurisdic­
tion of the concerned organs.
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review58, have at times been criticized for encouraging litigation by actors in 
the federal system, to frustrate political projects of their opponents at another 
level. Losers in the political process often resort to the Court to reverse a 
political decision. It is important to note that most of the federal powers in 
Germany belong to concurrent and framework powers. The federal 
government extensively used these powers and the FCC on its part insisted 
that whatever conditions stated in the Basic Law for the exercise of 
concurrent and framework powers is a matter for the discretion of the federal 
legislature. It subscribed to the political question doctrine and in the end the 
states lost much of their powers. In 1994 the Basic Law was amended, which 
has a bearing on the exercise of not only framework and concurrent powers 
but also on the jurisdiction of the FCC. An attempt is made to narrow down 
the discretion of the federal legislature in the exercise of concurrent and 
framework powers59. By doing so the Basic Law tries to extend the 
legislative autonomy of the states.
The failure by the FCC to exercise its power under the old provisions of the 
Basic Law to regulate the discretion of the federal legislature in the areas of 
framework and concurrent powers also prompted an amendment on the 
jurisdiction of the FCC. Accordingly, the Basic Law stipulates that the FCC 
has jurisdiction ‘in the event of disagreements whether a law meets the re­
quirements of paragraph (2) of Article 72 [this paragraph sets the conditions 
that should be complied with for the federal government in order to enact 
concurrent law], on application of the Bundesrat or of the government or leg­
islature of the Land.’60 Thus in Germany, unlike the United States, the juris­
diction of the FCC is express even in areas, which the United States Supreme 
Court would consider to be political. The new amendment is clear enough in 
this respect. It is an attempt to reverse the FCC’s earlier position at least in 
the areas of concurrent powers.
3.4- Federal issues in the Ethiopian Context
In the Ethiopian situation, it does not seem there is a need to consider the fed­
eral issues at two levels in the way the literature about the American system
58 Refers to the determination of whether a
norm of federal or state law is in conformity
with the Basic Law or whether a state law 
conforms to federal law. It can be initiated 
by federal or state government, one-third of 
the members of the Bundestag without refer­
ence to any concrete case. This procedure is 
unique in the sense that it has no parallel, for 
instance, in the United States. In the United 
States safeguarding the constitution is only
possible as long as there is a case. See Basic 
Law Article 93.
59 See Artiles 72 (2) and 75 (2) of the Basic 
Law.
60 Basic Law Article 93 (1) 2a. It is remark­
able that the Land legislature has the right to 
bring this action before the FCC. They are 
the ones who lost much of their power 
because of exces-sive exercise of federal 
concurrent power.
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provides. Nor is there any ground to trust the political process to safeguard 
federalism. Indeed the federal system in Ethiopia is unique, as the states have 
no role in the law-making process at federal level. When the Americans sug­
gest that the political processes can provide a better alternative, it is because 
the federal government and the states are actively involved in the federal leg­
islative process. The Senate is expected to check the lower house and safe­
guard the interests of the states. No such comparable guarantee exists in 
Ethiopia. The only guarantee for the nationalities appears to be the vigilant 
exercise of their powers as ultimate interpreters of the constitution. Yet, the 
same House, although considered by many as the House of nationalities, is a 
house dominated by the nationalities with the highest population count. Thus 
it is composed in a more or less similar fashion like the lower house. At any 
rate federalism in its broad sense, that is, defining the respective powers of 
the federal government and the states as well as checking the compatibility of 
federal and state laws with the constitution, is one area of jurisdiction for the 
HoF61. The issue of the political question doctrine becomes less relevant in 
this respect because from the outset the HoF is a political body. The debate 
on ‘judicial activism’ versus ‘judicial self-restraint’ is thus less relevant in 
the Ethiopian context. As the following cases illustrate, the HoF as a quasi- 
judicial/political body seems to be legitimate organ for cases that are of high 
political and constitutional significance.
The first controversial case concerns the Silte decision62 a case in which a 
certain community that were perceived to be part of the Guraghe ethnic 
group wanted to secede from the latter and set up a local government in the 
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS-one of 
the nine constituent units of the federation- inhabited by more than 56 small 
ethnic groups). The process involved, as required by the federal Constitution 
Arts 39 and 47, the local population, the regional parliament (constituted of 
the diverse groups) and the HoF but the respective role of these actors was 
never clear. The matter was finally resolved in 2000 by a referendum 
organized by the HoF in which large majority of the Silte's chose to secede 
and form a local government within the constituent unit. Given the 
complexity of the case (who is the 'self’ that determines the right to self-rule 
at local level?) and the number of institutions involved (the two ethnic groups 
at local level, the state parliament composed of the various ethnic groups and 
the HoF), the final decision of the HoF to submit the matter to a referendum, 
though the issue of who should participate in the referendum is far from 
settled, and the fact that the final verdict was gracefully accepted by all 
concerned indicates the wise approach adopted by the HoF.
61 This is implied under Article 23(4) of Proc. 62 See the opinion of the CCT written on 25
250/2001. January 2000 (unpublished).
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A second and more controversial one is the Benishangul-Gumuz case that 
involved the tension in the region between the indigenous groups (Berta, 
Gumuz, Shinasha, Komo and Mao) and the highlanders (Amhara, Oromo and 
Tigray nationalities). Candidates from Amhara, Oromo and Tigray 
nationalities for the 2000 election for the regional council were prohibited on 
the basis that they were not able to speak any one of the five languages 
namely Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Komo and Mao. Particularly the Berta in­
sisted that the candidates should not be allowed to run for office if none of 
them are versed in Berta language. It accordingly petitioned the Election 
Board and the latter decided to bar them from running as candidates stating 
that they were not able to speak the Berta language. The Amharas, Oromos 
and Tigray ans, most of them transferred to the region during the Derg’s 
(military regime that ruled the country from 1974-1991) resettlement pro­
gram (constituting some forty seven per cent of the population in the region), 
complained to the HoF against the decision of the Electoral Board on Yekatit 
10, 1992 E.C. (February 2000). The applicants argued that the decision of the 
Board violated their constitutional right to be elected granted to every citizen 
without any discrimination and asked the House to quash it as it contravenes 
the supremacy clause of the federal constitution (Article 9).
The CCI gave its opinion on Sene 29, 1992 (6 July 2000) to the HoF 
admitting that the application raises constitutional interpretation questions. 
The expert opinion constitutes majority and a dissenting one. The issues 
formulated were: as to whether the law63 which sets the conditions for 
candidature, one of which is knowledge of the vernacular of the state, is in 
violation of the constitution or not? And as to whether the decision of the 
Electoral Board based on such law is constitutional or not64.
The majority, after considering the relevant law and the Constitution65 rather
63 The law in question is the Proclamation to 
make the Electoral Law of Ethiopia conform 
with the Constitution of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proc. No. 
111/1995, Negarit Gazeta TGE, 54th year, 
No. 9 Addis Ababa, 23 February 1995.
64 See the opinion of the CCI (unpublished).
65 Article 38(1) of the federal constitution 
states ‘every Ethiopian national, without any 
discrimina-tion based on colour, race, na­
tion, nationality, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion or other status has 
the following rights:
a. to take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly and through freely chosen repre­
sentatives,
b. on the attainment of 18 years of age to vote 
in accordance with law,
c. to vote and to be elected at periodic elec­
tion to any office at any level of govern­
ments.
While Article 38 of proclamation 111/1995 
stating the criteria on candidacy states 1. 
Any person registered as an elector shall be 
eligible for candidature where he ... 
b) is versed in the vernacular of the na­
tional region of his intended candidature 
and the Amharic version states Yemi- 
wedaderbetin yebiherawi kilil kuanka 
yemiyawik (i.e. one who knows the lan­
guage of the constituency in which he/she 
is running for election)
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briefly opined that because the proclamation stated knowledge of the local 
language as a condition for candidacy, it violated the constitutional provision 
on the right to take part in conducting public offices as well as to be elected. 
Tt stated that the proclamation discriminates against those who are not versed 
in one of the local vernaculars and concluded the proclamation violated the 
Constitution. On the Board’s decision it stated that it is based on this uncon­
stitutional provision and because the law is referred to the HoF the viability 
of the decision hinges on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the 
proclamation referred to the HoF.
The minority view is more elaborate and is mainly based on the constitu­
tional argument that the issue has to be seen in light of the letter and spirit of 
the whole constitutional text rather than on a single provision and it needs 
balancing between two or more competing constitutional values. The minor­
ity acknowledged that there is an express clause on the right to elect and to 
be elected as well as the fact that the Constitution does not allow discrimina­
tion on the basis of language. However, it articulated that in this case there is 
no discrimination on the basis of language and considered the decision of the 
Board, not in violation of the Constitution.
Tt stated that the proclamation does not discriminate on the basis of language. 
In much the same way as in the Oromia, Amhara or Tigray regional states, 
that is constituent states in which the regional working language is the lan­
guage of one of the dominant nationalities, anyone who is not versed in the 
regional government’s working language cannot run for office as a candidate. 
By the same analogy, anyone who does not speak any of the local vernacular 
languages in Benishangul-Gumuz, whatever his or her nationality may be, 
cannot run for office and the minority insisted that this cannot be considered 
a violation of the Constitution on grounds of discrimination. The minority 
focused on the peculiarity of the Ethiopian federal system and its emphasis 
on the sovereignty of nationalities and the fact that language constitutes one 
essential attribute of identity.
The HoF considered both opinions but rendered a different decision which 
was more in line with the opinion of the minority than with that of the 
majority66. It emphasized that no doubt if the candidate is to speak for the
66 See decision of the HoF of Megabit 5, 1995 E.C (12 March 2003) that in a nutshell upheld 
the law as constitutional but declared the decision of the Board as unconstitutional and 
hence of no effect with prospective effect. It articulated that Article 38 of the proclamation 
is not in violation of Article 38 of the Constitution. It also underscored that whoever wants 
to run as a candidate is required to know the working language of the regional state, and 
not one of the local vernaculars (unpublished).
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people he/she claims to represent in parliament or to introduce his/her aims 
and programs to the electorate, he/she is required to know the regional 
official language. By virtue of the proclamation, the candidate is required to 
know the official language of the region and to that extent the proclamation 
does not contradict the principles of the Constitution. On the other hand, the 
House found the Board’s interpretation of the proclamation to mean a 
candidate should be versed in any of the indigenous languages, particularly 
the Berta language, one of the five languages spoken in the region that is not 
the official language of the regional state, unconstitutional and declared it 
null with prospective effect. Of interest in this regard is the fact that because 
of the multi-ethnic nature of the regional state and because Amharic is widely 
spoken by a large majority of the people in the region, the regional Council 
has adopted Amharic as the official language.
4. Comments on HoF Decisions
It is easier to start with the expert opinion of the CCI majority. They empha­
sized the constitutional provision of the right of the citizen to elect and to be 
elected and the principle of non-discrimination stipulated in the same text. 
According to the majority it does not matter whether the candidate who is 
elected in the regional council speaks or understands the local vernacular. 
The candidate has the right to be elected and cannot be prohibited because 
he/she does not speak the language. This misses the fundamental virtue of 
not only the Ethiopian Constitution, which is apparently based on the free 
will of nationalities, but also the values of federalism, unity in diversity. The 
nationalities are declared sovereign under the Ethiopian constitution and con­
stituent states are established to empower at least some of the major nation­
alities to have their own ‘mother’ states, the right to administer themselves, 
to use their own language and even to secede. In multicultural federations in 
as much as we need to have a politically and economically integrated society, 
we also have to respect and promote diversity. The crucial issue is to draw 
the balance between the two.
The minority opinion, even though it emphasized the importance of 
investigating the whole text and the fact that the nationalities are considered 
as the building bricks of the federation, was not specific enough as in the 
decision of the HoF to emphasize the point that what is required under the 
proclamation is the candidate’s knowledge of the working language of the 
regional state, and not of any of the local vernaculars. But in doing so the 
minority have touched upon one of the thorny issues in the federal system to 
which neither the majority nor the HoF was able to provide an answer. Could 
one really argue with a lot of emphasis that a candidate cannot run for office
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as long as she/he cannot understand even one of the local languages? Would 
it be possible to give an affirmative answer to this question under the 
constitution or should these multi-ethnic regions be subject to a different 
treatment: they do not have their own regional governments and because 
many ethnic groups are living there they had to adopt Amaharic for 
communication and because of this highlanders are not required to know any 
of the local vernaculars. This raises the central issue of the dilemma in the 
federal system67 on the one hand declaring the equality of states and nation­
alities whereas on the other hand only some nationalities have their own con­
stituent states. Those who do not have their own constituent states cannot 
impose the language requirement on the candidate as is the case in other re­
gional states, for example Amhara, Somali, Oromia and Tigray. This is a 
question that opens Pandora’s box.
There are two options here. One may be tempted to state that if in the states 
of Amhara, Oromia, Afar, Tigray and Somali knowing a local language is a 
requirement to run for public office, there is no reason to deny multi-ethnic 
regions the same right. Because they do not have their own constituent state, 
they should not be subjected to different treatment. Otherwise a clear consti­
tutional asymmetry is going to evolve between those nationalities that have 
their own ‘mother states’ and those that do not. Or should we simply reiterate 
that after all the Constitution has made that clear by recognizing only nine 
constituent states with its own implications?68
A related argument can be deduced from the federal Constitution. As several 
sections of the Constitution indicate, at least formally speaking, the Ethiopian 
Constitution is closer to a confederation than a federation69. It emphasizes the 
sovereignty of nationalities, it grants nationalities the right to self­
determination, secession included; there is no federal supremacy clause
67 This dilemma is clear under Article 46, 
which recognizes only nine members of the 
federation, while in fact there are more than 
eighty ethnic groups and secondly there is 
the dilemma we are noting in this section: 
ethnic versus multicultural federation.
68 His Excellency Dr. Gebreab, former Minis­
ter of State at the Ministry of Federal Af­
fairs, speaks of ‘minority states,’ in refer­
ence to these multi-ethnic states, particularly 
Harari, Gambela and Benishangul-Gumuz. 
These are states in which the numerical mi­
nority is permitted to dominate the local 
political process, consequence of the inher-
ent feature of the federal system. Speech 
made at the First National Conference on 
Federalism, Conflict and Peace Building, 
Addis Ababa, May 5-7, 2003.
9 See the Preamble, Articles 8, 39 that 
among others proclaim sovereign nationali­
ties with right to self-determination includ­
ing secession, coming together to establish a 
federation, granting the federal government 
only limited powers and maintaining the 
residue for themselves; yet this has been 
counterbalanced by a centralized federal 
practice.
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unlike many other federal constitutions. It appears that the nationalities are 
considered as building bricks as if they preceded the federation. All this 
taken together seems to indicate that at the time of the federal bargain the 
forces of diversity prevailed over the forces of unity whereas in many work­
ing federations one finds a balance in which forces of unity slightly prevail 
over the forces of diversity. If this argument is pushed further then it may 
imply that the Constitution has taken a position as far as the tension between 
collective versus individual rights is concerned, in favor of the former. If so, 
the decision of the Electoral Board, however absurd it may be in creating 
‘small islands’ everywhere, forcing every citizen to find out where his 
‘mother state’ is, could be justified.
This is, however, contrary to the political and economic integration envis­
aged by the federal Constitution. In the Preamble it is stated ‘We, the nations, 
nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia: strongly committed, to building a po­
litical community founded on the rule of law.... Convinced that to live as one 
economic community is necessary in order to create sustainable and mutually 
supportive conditions...have, therefore, adopted this Constitution through 
representatives we have duly elected for this purpose as an instrument that 
binds us in mutual commitment to fulfil the objectives and the principles set 
forth above.’ Thus, it is a clear political and economic integration that the 
federation envisages. It is good to note the emphasis given to the free 
movement of labour and capital across the country as a means to enhance this 
project in a recent federal document70. Seen from this angle, the position of 
the minority is an extreme.
Another argument against the minority could be deduced from the Constitu­
tion. The Constitution has for one reason or another made a choice (Article 
46). By outlining only nine member states it seems to have defined what con­
stitutes majority and minority nationalities. One can then conclude that the 
language test under Article 38 of the proclamation is only applicable to those 
states defined under Articles 46 and 47 and not to other states. Lastly, the 
position of the minority in the CCI’s decision not only enhances majority- 
minority tension but goes even further and creates minority tyranny over 
majority in some of the constituent states. The CCI minority by adopting 
such a position closes its eyes to the rights of economic migrants. Yet, the 
decision of the HoF skilfully escapes this thorny issue by focusing on the 
technical interpretation of the provisions of the proclamation without 
substantively addressing the concerns of the indigenous ethnic groups.
70 See Be Ethiopia Ye Democrasiyawi Sirat Ginbata Gudayoch, Ginbot 1994 E.C. (Addis 
Ababa, Ministry of Information) Pp. 32-35; 169, 180, 207, 214.
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Despite the above mentioned limitations, the decision on this case is perhaps 
one of the most celebrated decisions of the HoF that attempted to strike a bal­
ance between the concerns of the different groups.
In addition to the cases so far discussed, the HoF has resolved the border dis­
pute between Oromia and the Somali regional state71. A controversy that en­
sued following the restructuring of the regional states in line with the 1995 
Constitution with a view to ensuring self rule to the nationalities. There arose 
a boundary dispute between the two regions covering long disputed boundary 
and that was finally resolved by a referendum organized by the HoF. Because 
of its sensitivity and magnitude, the HoF entered into extensive dialogue with 
the communities involved, the two regional governments and finally reached 
at an amicable settlement.
Indeed, given the comparative experience -the Supreme Court of the US 
imposing self restraint on itself based on the 'political question' doctrine and 
the German FCC hesitating to enforce matters that it felt belongs to the 
political branches, the HoF's bold assertion in the three cases (i.e. Selti refer­
endum, Beneshngul Gumuz case and the Oromia-Somali border issue) indi­
cate the point that the HoF is an appropriate body for issues in the grey area 
between law and politics. Yet the HoF's jurisdiction needs to be confined to 
cases that have a high political and constitutional significance. These are 
matters with significant political flavour for which the judiciary may be ill 
suited to handle with care.
5. Concrete Review and Individual Complaints
Two other areas of jurisdiction for the HoF include the concrete review and 
individual complaints. There is an interesting similarity in this respect 
between the FCC and the HoF.72 In case of concrete review, the regular judi-
71 The two regional states share more than 
1000 km border area. In the border areas 
inhabited by nomadic people, the tension
between communities over grazing land 
and water predates the present federal set 
up. But with the introduction of the state 
restructuring after 1991, mobility was 
somehow restricted which intensified re­
source competition. For more on the con­
flict regarding Babile see Ahmed Shide, 
"Conflicts Along Oromia-Somali State 
Bound-aries: The Case of Babile District," 
in First National Conference on Federal­
ism, Conflict and Peace Building (Addis 
Ababa: United Printers, 2003) Pp. 96-112. 
As of September 2004, the long overdue 
issue of settling the border between 
Oromia and Somalia regional states seem 
to be finally subject to a referendum or­
ganized by the HoF on 463 Kebeles 
claimed by both regions. See Reporter 
(Amharic) Meskerem 30, 1997
72 See Article 84 of Ethiopian Constitution; 
Art. 21 of Proc. 250/2001; Article 100 of 
the Basic Law.
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ciary, if it comes across a case the disposition of which requires the interpre­
tation of the constitution or the checking of the compatibility of the law at 
issue with the constitution, must refer the constitutionality issue to the FCC 
or the HoF, because reviewing the constitutionality of laws is the jurisdiction 
of the Constitutional Court or the HoF. The court adjudicating the merits of 
the case does not have the jurisdiction to investigate the constitutionality is­
sue. The reference to the FCC or the HoF could be made by the court on its 
own initiative or on the application of parties. There is thus a split of function 
between the regular court that decides on the merits of the case and the FCC 
or the HoF that decides the conformity of the legislation with the constitution 
without going into the merits of the case. This is different from the American 
courts in which in principle any court decides the constitutionality of the law 
in the process of deciding the merit of the case. The monopoly power of the 
FCC or the HoF in many parliamentary federations is justified by the respect 
for the legislature. Not every court should be allowed to disregard the will of 
parliament73.
An interesting issue in this respect concerns the question when the court is 
bound to refer the matter to the HoF or the FCC. Is it enough for the court to 
refer the constitutionality issue so long as an objection to this effect is raised 
by one of the parties or should the court wait until there is some doubt on the 
law’s constitutionality or should the court convince itself beyond doubt that 
the law is unconstitutional? This is crucial because if the court has to 
establish for itself that there is a prima facie case of unconstitutionality, 
before referring the matter, then the court is in a way reviewing, albeit not 
conclusively, the constitutionality of the law. It is only that it cannot repeal or 
declare the law unconstitutional. Apart from this, if mere objection by a party 
leads to a reference of the case to the FCC or the HoF then the jurisdiction of 
the court could practically be hampered for trivial reasons. It is in recognition 
of this fact that the law stipulates: ‘The Court handling the case shall submit 
it to the CCI only if it believes that there is a need for constitutional 
interpretation in deciding the case.’74
The last procedure concerns what the Basic Law calls ‘constitutional 
complaints.’75 The same is stipulated under the new law in Ethiopia. ‘Any 
person who alleges that his fundamental rights and freedoms have been
73 William Karl Geck, "Judicial Review of 
Statutes: A Comparative Survey of Present 
Institutions and Practices," Cornell Law 
Review 51 (1965-66) p. 279.
74 Art. 21(2) of Proc 250/2001. The Basic
Law Article 100 stipulates the same princi­
ple. See also Martin Borowski, "The Begin­
nings of Germany’s Federal Constitutional 
Court," Ratio Juris 16:2 (June 2003) p. 156. 
75 See Article 93 (1) 4a of the Basic Law.
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violated by the final decision of any government institution or official may 
present his case to the CCI for constitutional interpretation.’76 This is 
significant in the sense that the constitution was silent on constitutional 
complaints. In Germany this procedure has both subjective and objective 
purposes. It was introduced to serve as a form of legal protection to the 
individual once certain procedures for its exercise are complied with. It is an 
extraordinary remedy available to the individual for protecting the 
individual’s basic rights and in that sense it is there to render a legal remedy 
to an individual against any law, directive or final decision of any branch of 
the government, including the judiciary. On the other hand, it also has an 
objective function. The decision might clarify a general constitutional issue 
or might preserve the legal system in general. In the latter case even if the 
complaint is withdrawn, the FCC may continue to render its decisions 
because it is of general interest to the legal system77.
The relevance of the complaint procedure is not yet an established practice in 
Ethiopia. Nor is the distinction between objective and subjective purposes of 
the complaint well understood. In one case78 (before the issuance of the new 
law), the CCI rendered a decision that gave the impression that this proce­
dure has only a subjective purpose. The real parties in dispute were husband 
and wife involved in a divorce case. A Sharia Court had already rendered a 
decision, but the wife who was not happy with the outcome of the case took 
the matter to the Federal First Instance Court, requesting for the reversal of 
the decision of the Sharia Court. The husband, on the other hand, applied to 
the Islamic Affairs Supreme Council requesting this body to intervene on 
behalf of the Muslim community in general in finding out whether the regu­
lar judiciary has the competence to review decisions of religious courts.
The alleged unconstitutionality was related to the fact that the Sharia Court 
has already rendered a binding decision to the parties. The Supreme Council 
lodged a petition to the CCI on the matter. The issue before the CCI was 
whether (or not) ordinary courts (at whatever level) have the constitutional 
mandate to review the decisions of the Sharia Courts pursuant to Articles 34 
(5)79 and 78(5) of the Ethiopian Constitution. The CCI sadly dismissed the
76 Article 23(1) of Proc. 250/ 2001.
77 Borowski, supra note 74 at 174.
78 The case was submitted to the CCI by the 
Islamic Affairs Supreme Council in Tikimit
1992 (October 1999) and decided by the 
CCI on Tirr 17, 1992 E.C. (25 January , 
2000).
79 Article 34(5) states: ‘This Constitution 
shall not preclude the adjudication of dis-
putes relating to personal and family laws in 
accordance with religious or customary 
laws, with the consent of the parties to the 
dispute.’ And Article 78(5) partly provides: 
‘Pursuant to sub-Article 5 of Article 34 the 
HoPR and State Councils can establish or 
give official recognition to religious and 
customary courts.’
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case on the ground that only the parties to the dispute, not the Supreme 
Council, have the standing to refer the matter to the CCI.
Yet, the CCI’s position is subject to criticism. Although the decision of the 
CCI or the HoF in the end would have an implication for the parties in dis­
pute, the case mainly sought an abstract or general remedy from the CCI. The 
Supreme Council was as representative of the Muslim community seeking to 
define the scope of legal pluralism tolerated by the Constitution. It was an 
attempt as such to define the role of religious and traditional institutions 
within the general constitutional framework.
It is important to mention that the procedure of constitutional complaint both 
in Germany and Ethiopia is subject to rigorous scrutiny before the FCC or 
the HoF admits the application. In Germany, because the number of 
constitutional complaints increased in the course of time, a committee of 
three judges usually undertakes preliminary examination before the 
complaint is admitted.80 The applicant is also required to exhaust remedies in 
the lower courts before applying to the FCC. The new law in Ethiopia 
stipulates similar requirements. Not only is exhaustion of remedies in the 
relevant government institution required but the applicant is also required to 
have a final decision, that is an adjudication that has been exhausted and 
against which no appeal lies along the same path. These requirements, rigor­
ous as they might appear, try to sift out only the most relevant ones prevent­
ing the excessive flow of cases to the FCC or the HoF. It should not be for­
gotten that these bodies are established to adjudicate only constitutional is­
sues, distinct from the practice with decentralized forms of review.
Conclusion
As illustrated in the cases, the HoF has played an important role in the 
adjudication of constitutional matters particularly those cases that are of high 
political significance. The fact that the HoF is composed of representatives of 
nationalities indirectly elected by the electorate at regional level seems to 
give the HoF the profile of a political organ than a judicial one. Nevertheless 
this is not without possible implications as to its impartiality as Ethiopia is 
venturing into a multiparty politics. So far, there has been one ruling party at 
federal and state levels and the HoF's impartiality has not been brought to 
test. With the emerging multiparty politics, however, it remains to be seen 
how far the HoF will serve as an impartial adjudicator on important intergov­
ernmental conflicts.
80 Article 13 paragraph 8 (a) of the Law on FCC (1958).
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A more challenging issue to the HoF, however, is the fact that it is composed 
of important figures coming from the regions. While this may positively con­
tribute on the HoF's ability to serve as a forum for addressing regional con­
cerns, it may at the same time serve as an obstacle because the HoF is in a 
way becoming a part time House. Unless extra-ordinary circumstances dic­
tate, records so far indicate that it (in reality) meets only twice a year. Appar­
ently, the Constitution (Article 83) imposes a duty on the HoF to decide cases 
within thirty days of receipt of opinion from the CCI, while it actually holds 
its regular session once in six months. Under such circumstances and in view 
of the magnitude of cases that involve competing inter-regional government 
interests, the House certainly needs to be more active and efficient commen­
surate to its functions. It is thus suggested that HoF should in the long run 
aim at having its own permanent members.
In relation to the jurisdiction of courts, the new laws and the recent case seem 
to leave no room for the judiciary as far as the adjudication of constitutional 
matters is concerned. It is, however, the contention of this author that the 
constitutionality of the new laws need to be challenged as it was not the in­
tention of the framers of the Constitution to rule out the jurisdiction of the 
judiciary from all constitutional matters. _________________■
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